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5.1 Introduction
In the debate on globalization and the environment, there is concern that
the erasing of national borders through reduced barriers to trade will lead
to competition for investment and jobs, resulting in a worldwide degrada-
tion of environmental standards (the “race-to-the-bottom” eﬀect) and/or
in a delocalization of heavily polluting industries in countries with lower
standards (the “pollution-havens” eﬀect). Moreover, environmentalists
and ecologically oriented academics argue that the political economy of
decision making is stacked up against the environment. In the North, Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) interest
groups that support protectionist measures for other reasons continue to
invoke the race-to-the-bottom model, relying on the perception that the
regulatory gap automatically implies a race to the bottom, even though
some have argued that countries may circumvent international agreements
on tariﬀs by choosing strategic levels of domestic regulation. Because
avoidance of a race to the bottom would call for the enforcement of uni-
form environmental standards in all countries, which cannot be created,
they argue for trade restrictions until the regulatory gap is closed. In the
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suggestions, and conference participants for useful comments.South, corruption is likely to result in poor enforcement of the regulatory
framework. Finally, at the international level, environmental activists fear
that the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) favors trade interests over environmental protection.
To sum up, the arguments raised above, as well as empirical evidence re-
viewed below, suggest that trade liberalization and globalization (in the
form of reduced transaction costs) could lead to a global increase in envi-
ronmental pollution as well as to an increase in resource depletion as nat-
ural resource–exploiting industries, from forest-logging companies to min-
ing companies, relocate to places with less strict standards or use the threat
of relocation to prevent the imposition of stricter standards. These eﬀects
are likely to be more important the further environmental policy is from
the optimum and the less well-deﬁned property rights are (as is the case for
the so-called global commons). It is therefore not surprising that, even if
trade liberalization and globalization more generally can lead both to an
overall increase in welfare (especially if environmental policy is not too far
from the optimum) and to a deterioration in environmental quality, a fun-
damental clash will persist between free-trade proponents and environ-
mentalists.
This paper addresses the relation between globalization and the en-
vironment by reexamining evidence of a North-South delocalization of
heavily polluting industries.1 Section 5.2 reviews the evidence on pollution
havens,2 arguing that it is either too detailed (ﬁrm-speciﬁc or emission-
speciﬁc evidence) or too fragmentary (case studies) to give a broad appre-
ciation of the extent of delocalization over the past twenty years. The sub-
sequent sections then turn to new evidence based on worldwide production
and trade data (ﬁfty-two countries) at a reasonable level of disaggregation
(three-digit international standard industrial classiﬁcation [ISIC]) and
over a suﬃciently long time period, 1981–1998.3 In section 5.3, we report
on the worldwide evolution of heavy polluters (the so-called dirty indus-
tries) and on the evolution of North-South revealed comparative advan-
tage indexes. Section 5.4 then estimates a gravity trade model to examine
bilateral patterns of trade in polluting products. Estimates reveal that trans-
port costs may have acted as a brake on North-South relocation, and fail
to detect a regulatory-gap eﬀect.
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1. The causes of any detected relocation will not be identiﬁed because we are dealing with
fairly aggregate data.
2. In the public debate, the “pollution-havens” eﬀect refers either to an output reduction of
polluting industries (and an increase in imports) in developed countries or to the relocation
of industries abroad via foreign direct investment in response to a reduction in import pro-
tection or a regulatory gap.
3. The main database has been elaborated by Nicita and Olarreaga (2001). The appendix
to this chapter describes data manipulation and the representativity of the sample in terms of
global trade and production in polluting activities.5.2 Pollution Havens or Pollution Halos?
We review ﬁrst the evidence on trade liberalization and patterns of trade
in polluting industries based on multicountry studies that try to detect
evidence of North-South delocalization. We then summarize results from
single-country (often ﬁrm-level) studies that use more reliable environ-
mental variables and are also generally better able to control for unobserv-
able heterogeneity bias. We conclude with lessons from case studies and
political-economy considerations.
5.2.1 Evidence on Production and Trade in Dirty Products
Evidence from aggregate production and trade data is based on a com-
parison between “clean” and “dirty” industries, the classiﬁcation relying
invariably on U.S. data, either on expenditure abatement costs or on emis-
sions of pollutants.4
Table 5.1summarizes the results from these studies. Overall, the studies,
which for the most part use the same deﬁnition of dirty industries as we do,5
usually ﬁnd mild support for the pollution-havens hypothesis.
The large number of countries and the industrial-level approach gives
breadth of scope to the studies described in table 5.1, but at a cost. First,
changing patterns of production and trade could be due to omitted vari-
ables and unobserved heterogeneity that cannot be easily controlled-for in
large samples where aggregated data say very little about industry choices
which would shed light on ﬁrms or production stages (Zarsky 1999, 66).
For example, as pointed out by Mani and Wheeler (1999) in their case
study of Japan, changes in local factor costs (price of energy, price of land)
and changes in policies other than the stringency of environmental regula-
tions could account for observed changes in trade patterns. Second, these
studies give no evidence on investment patterns and on how these might re-
act to changes in environmental regulation, which is at the heart of the pol-
lution-havens debate.6 It is therefore not totally surprising that the papers
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4. Most work on the United States is based on pollution-abatement capital expenditures or
on pollution-abatement costs (see, e.g., Levinson and Taylor 2002, table 1). It turns out that
the alternative classiﬁcation based on emissions (see Hettige et al. 1995) produces a similar
ranking for the cleanest and dirtiest industries (ﬁve of the top six pollution industries are the
same in both classiﬁcations).
5. As in this paper, polluting industries were classiﬁed on the basis of the comprehensive in-
dex of emissions per unit of output described in Hettige et al. (1995). That index includes con-
ventional air, water, and heavy metals pollutants. As to the applicability of that index based
on U.S. data to developing countries, Hettige et al. conclude that, even though pollution in-
tensity is likely to be higher, “the pattern of sectoral rankings may be similar” (1995, 2).
6. Smarzynska and Wei (2001) cite the following extract from “A Fair Trade Bill of Rights”
proposed by the Sierra Club: “In our global economy, corporations move operations freely
around the world, escaping tough control laws, labor standards, and even the taxes that pay




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.surveyed in Dean (1992) and Zarsky (1999), by and large, fail to detect a sig-
niﬁcant correlation between the location decisions of multinationals and
the environmental standards of host countries. This suggests that, after
all, when one goes beyond aggregate industry data, the pollution-havens
hypothesis may be a popular myth.
Recent studies respond to the criticism that the evidence so far does not
address the research needs because of excessive aggregation. However, this
recent evidence, summarized below, is still very partial, and heavily fo-
cused on the United States.
5.2.2 Evidence on the Location of Dirty Industries
Levinson and Taylor (2002) revisit the single-equation model of Gross-
man and Krueger (1993), using panel data for U.S. imports in a two-
equation model in which abatement costs are a function of exogenous in-
dustry characteristics while imports are a function of abatement costs.
Contrary to previous estimates, they ﬁnd support for the pollution-havens
hypothesis: Industries whose abatement costs increased the most saw the
largest relative increase in imports from Mexico, Canada, Latin America,
and the rest of the world.7
Drawing on environmental costs across the United States that are more
comparable than the rough indexes that must be used in cross-country
work, Keller and Levinson (2002) analyze inward foreign direct investment
(FDI) into the United States over the period 1977–1994. They ﬁnd robust
evidence that relative (across states) abatement costs had moderate deter-
rent eﬀects on foreign investment.
Others have analyzed outward FDI to developing countries. Eskeland
and Harrison (2003) examine inward FDI in Mexico, Morocco, Venezuela,
and Côte d’Ivoire at the four-digit level using U.S. abatement-cost data
controlling for country-speciﬁc factors. They ﬁnd weak evidence of some
FDI being attracted to sectors with high levels of air pollution, but no evi-
dence of FDI to avoid abatement costs. They also ﬁnd that foreign ﬁrms are
more fuel-eﬃcient in that they use lower amounts of “dirty fuels.” This ev-
idence supports the pollution-halo hypothesis: superior technology and
management, coupled with demands by “green” consumers in the OECD,
lift industry standards overall.8
Smarzynska and Wei (2001) estimate a probit of FDI of 534 multina-
tionals in twenty-four transition economies during the period 1989–1994
as a function of host-country characteristics. These include a transformed
(to avoid outlier dominance) U.S.-based index of dirtiness of the ﬁrm at the
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7. Ederington and Minier (2003) also revisit the Grossman and Krueger study, assuming
that pollution regulation is endogenous, but determined by political-economy motives. They
also ﬁnd support for the pollution-havens hypothesis, this time because ineﬃcient industries
seek protection via environmental legislation.
8. The mixed evidence on the pollution-halo hypothesis is reviewed in Zarsky (1999).four-digit level, an index of the laxity of the host country’s environmental
standards captured by a corruption index, and several measures of envi-
ronmental standards (participation in international treaties, quality of air
and water standards, observed reductions in various pollutants). In spite of
this careful attempt at unveiling a pollution-haven eﬀect, they conclude
that host-country environmental standards (after controlling for other
country characteristics, including corruption) had very little impact on
FDI inﬂows.
5.2.3 Case Studies and Political-Economy Considerations
Reviewing recently available data, Wheeler (2001) shows that suspended
particulate matter release (the most dangerous form of air pollution) has
been declining rapidly in Brazil, China, and Mexico, fast-growing coun-
tries in the era of globalization and big recipients of FDI. Organic water
pollution is also found to fall drastically as income per capita rises (poor-
est countries have approximately tenfold diﬀerential pollution intensity).9
In addition to the standard explanations (pollution control is not a critical
cost factor for ﬁrms; large multinationals adhere to OECD standards),
Wheeler also points out that case studies show that low-income communi-
ties often penalize dangerous polluters even when formal regulation is ab-
sent or weak. Wheeler concludes that the “bottom” rises with economic
growth.
This result is reinforced by recent evidence based on a political-economy
approach that endogenizes corruption in the decision-making process. As-
suming that governments accept bribes in formulation of their regulatory
policies, Damia, Fredriksson, and List (2000) ﬁnd support in panel data
for thirty countries over the period 1982–1992 that the level of environ-
mental stringency is negatively correlated with an index of corruption and
positively with an index of trade openness. Given that corruption is typi-
cally higher in low-income countries, this corroborates the earlier ﬁnding
mentioned above, that environmental stringency increases rapidly with in-
come.
5.3 Shifting Patterns of Production and 
Comparative Advantage in Polluting Industries
Direct approaches to the measurement of pollution emission (e.g.,
Grossman and Krueger 1993; Dean 2002; Antweiler, Copeland, and Tay-
lor 2001; and several of the studies mentioned above) use emission esti-
mates at geographical sites of pollutant particles (sulfur dioxide is a fa-
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9. These results accord with independent estimates of environmental performance con-
structed by Dasgupta et al. (1996) from responses to a detailed questionnaire administered to
145 countries (they ﬁnd a correlation of about 0.8 between their measure of environment per-
formance or environment policy and income per capita).vorite) or the release of pollutants into several media (e.g., air, water, etc.).
That approach has several advantages: Emissions are directly measured at
each site, and it is not assumed that pollutant intensity is the same across
countries. On the other hand, activity (e.g., production levels) is not mea-
sured directly. Arguably, this is a shortcoming if one is interested in the pol-
lution-havens hypothesis. Indeed, emissions could be high for other rea-
sons than the relocation of ﬁrms to countries with low standards (China’s
use of coal as an energy source is largely independent of the existence of
pollution havens).
The alternative chosen here is to use an approach in which emission in-
tensity is not measured directly. We adopt the approach in the studies sum-
marized in table 5.1, where dirty industries are classiﬁed according to an
index of emission intensity in the air, water, and heavy metals in the United
States described in footnote 4. We selected the same ﬁve most polluting in-
dustries in the United States in 1987 selected by Mani and Wheeler (1999;
three-digit ISIC code in parenthesis): iron and steel (371), nonferrous met-
als (372), industrial chemicals (351), nonmetallic mineral products (369),
and pulp and paper (341).10 According to Mani and Wheeler, compared to
the ﬁve cleanest U.S. manufacturing activities—textiles, (321), nonelectric
machinery (382), electric machinery (383), transport equipment (384), and
instruments (385)—the dirtiest have the following characteristics: 40 per-
cent less labor-intensive; capital-output ratio twice as high; and energy-
intensity ratio three times as high.
5.3.1 Shifting Patterns of Production
We start with examination of the broad data for our sample of ﬁfty-two
countries over the period 1981–1998. The sample (years and countries) is
the largest for which we could obtain production data matching trade data
at the three-digit ISIC level. Compared to the earlier studies mentioned in
table 5.1, this sample has production data for a larger group of countries,
though at a cost because comprehensive data—only available since 1981—
implies that we are missing some of the early years of environmental regu-
lation in OECD countries in the seventies.
Because there is a close correlation between the stringency of environ-
mental regulation and income per capita, we start with histograms of in-
dexes of pollution intensity ranked by income per capita quintile (the data
are three-year averages at the beginning and end of period). Given our
sample size, each quintile has ten or eleven observations.
Figure 5.1 reveals a slight change in the middle of the distribution of pro-
duction and consumption of dirty industries, as the second-richest quintile
sees a reduction in production and consumption shares in favor of the
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10. Mani and Wheeler (1999, table 1) describe the intensity of pollutant emissions in water,
air, and heavy metals.highest and lowest quintiles. Turning to export and import shares (ﬁg. 5.2),
one notices a reduction in both trade shares of the highest quintile in favor
of the remaining quintiles.
These aggregate ﬁgures mask compositional shifts apparent from in-
spection of the histograms at the industry level (see appendix ﬁg. 5A.1).
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A
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Fig. 5.1 Histograms of output and consumption shares of polluting products: 
A, Output; B, Consumption For the second-richest quintile, the output share is always decreasing, but
changes in the export share vary a lot across sectors. For the richest quin-
tile, the output share is decreasing except for paper and products (ISIC
341) and other nonmetallic mineral products (369), while the export share
is always decreasing, except for nonferrous metals (372).
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Fig. 5.2 Histograms of exports and imports shares of polluting products: 
A, Exports; B, Imports In sum, these broad ﬁgures suggest some delocalization of pollution in-
dustries to poorer economies. However, aggregate eﬀects are weak, partly
because of opposite patterns at the sector level.
5.3.2 Shifting Patterns of Revealed Comparative Advantage
We look next for further evidence of changes in trade patterns in dirty
industries. We report on revealed comparative advantage (RCA) indexes
computed at the beginning or at the end of the sample period; RCA indexes
are not measures of comparative advantage, since they also incorporate the
eﬀects of changes in the policy environment (trade policy, regulatory envi-
ronment, etc).
The RCA index for country i and product p is given by
(1) RCAi





















wa) is country i’s share in world exports of polluting products
(of all products) and Sip
ia(Swa
wp) is the share of polluting products in total ex-
ports of country i (of the world).
Countries are split into two income groups (see appendix table 5A.1)
that replicate the distinction between the three poorest and two richest
quintiles of the previous section: twenty-two high-income countries (1991
gross national product [GNP] per capita larger than U.S.$7,910 according
to the World Bank) and thirty low- and middle-income countries. Here-
after, the former group is designed by developed countries (DCs) or
“North,” and the latter by less-developed countries (LDCs) or “South.”
A ﬁrst glimpse at the aggregate ﬁgures (see table 5.2) conﬁrms that
LDCs’ share in world trade of polluting products is on the rise. But the av-
erage annual rate of growth is lower for polluting products than for exports
in general. As a result, LDCs as a whole exhibit a decreasing RCA (and an
increasing revealed comparative disadvantage) in polluting products (see
last columns of table 5.2).
However, inspection at the industry level (see appendix table 5A.5) re-
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Table 5.2 Developing Countries’ World Trade Shares (percentages except for RCA, RCD)
Revealed Comparative
Indexes
Polluting Products All Products
Advantage Disadvantage
Exports Imports Exports Imports (RCA) (RCD)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1)/(3) (2)/(4)
1981–83 9.08 18.87 9.40 15.73 0.97 1.20
1996–98 14.46 22.98 15.93 18.67 0.91 1.23
Average annual 
growth rate 3.15 1.32 3.58 1.15
Note: Blank cells indicate not calculated.Globalization and Dirty Industries: Do Pollution Havens Matter? 177
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Fig. 5.3 Revealed comparative advantage indexes in polluting products: A, Devel-
oping countries; B, Developed countries (countries ranked by decreasing RCA)
veals that this reverse-delocalization outcome is due to the dominating
eﬀect of nonferrous metals (ISIC 372). All four of the other industries pre-
sent some ingredient of delocalization, with a particularly strong increasein
RCA for industrial chemicals (351). Interestingly, nonferrous metals rep-
resented more than 40 percent of LDCs exports at the beginning and less
than 25 percent at the end of the period, while the pattern is exactly oppo-
site for industrial chemicals.
To unveil cross-country variations, ﬁgure 5.3ranks countries by decreas-ing order of RCAs for both income groups. In each case, the dashed line
represents the end-of-period pattern, with countries ranked by decreasing
order of comparative advantage so that all observations above (below)
unity correspond to countries with a revealed comparative advantage (dis-
advantage). A shift to the right (left) implies increasing (decreasing) RCA,
and a ﬂattening of the curve, a less-pronounced pattern of specialization.
Overall, LDCs’ pattern of RCAs is characterized by higher upper values
of RCAs and a steeper curve than for high-income countries. Over time,
both curves appear to shift right11 and to become somewhat ﬂatter. The
increase in RCAs seems larger in LDCs, where it is concentrated in the
middle of the distribution, while it basically aﬀects the end of the distribu-
tion in the other income group. At the industry level (see appendix ﬁgure
5A.2) results for LDCs are quite similar, except for nonferrous metals,
where the RCA curve shifts in.12
Still, the above pattern does not say anything about the changing pat-
tern of RCAs between the North and the South, which is what the delocal-
ization hypothesis is about. To measure this eﬀect, we introduce a new
decomposition that isolates the impact of geography on the RCA index.










where the bilateral RCA (RCAij
p) is deﬁned as the ratio between the share
of product p in all exports of country i to country j (Sijp
ija) and the share of
product p in total world exports (Swa
wp). This share is weighted by the share
of country j in total exports of country i to the world (Sija
iwa).
Now let the world be divided in two groups of countries: nS in the South
and nN in the North (nS   nN   N). Then equation (2) can be rewritten as
(3) RCAi
p   Si













p is the South’s contribution and Ni
p the North’s contribution to
RCA i
p. Thus, in terms of variation between the end (1996–1998) and the
beginning (1981–1983) of the sample period, one obtains
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11. This result may seem puzzling, but the contradiction is only apparent: the weighted sum
of RCAs is indeed equal to 1.0, but the weights can vary. Thus, a simultaneous increase in all
RCA indexes may well happen, provided a larger weight is put on smaller values.
12. Note that the pattern illustrated by ﬁgure 5.3 reﬂects only a “structural” eﬀect, i.e., the
change of individual RCAs. The evolution of the aggregate RCA for LDCs as a group is also
governed by a “composition” eﬀect, namely the impact of changes in countries’ shares keep-
ing RCA indexes constant. Straightforward calculations reveal that for LDCs the composi-
tion eﬀect (–0.19) has been stronger than the structural eﬀect (0.13), leading to a net decrease
of the aggregate RCA reported in table 5.2 (for results at the industry level, see table 5A.6).(4)  RCA i
p    Si
p    Ni
p
Results from applying this decomposition to the two groups of countries
are reported in table 5.3. For each polluting sector, we report the (un-
weighted) average of both sides of equation (4) over the LDCs’ group. It
appears that in all cases but one, the North’s contribution to the change in
LDCs’ RCA is positive. This result is consistent with the pollution-havens
eﬀect. Again, the only exception is nonferrous metal, where North-South
trade has negatively contributed to the RCA of the South.
In sum, the RCA-based evidence on delocalization of polluting activi-
ties toward the South is rather mixed. As a group, developing countries
exhibit a surprising reverse-delocalization pattern of increasing revealed
comparative disadvantage in polluting products. However, as shown
above, this reﬂects both the pattern of one particular industry (nonferrous
metals) and a composition eﬀect: within the group of developing coun-
tries, those less prone to export polluting products have gained ground. In
fact, most developing countries have actually experienced an increase in
their RCA in polluting products. Moreover, after controlling for geo-
graphy, it turns out that for all but for one case (nonferrous metals), North-
South trade has had a positive impact on LDCs’ comparative advantage
in these products.
5.4 Bilateral Trade Patterns in Polluting Products
Dirty industries are typically weight-reducing industries. They are also
intermediate-goods-producing industries. As a result, if they move to the
South, then transport costs must be incurred if the ﬁnal (consumer goods)
products are still produced in the North—as would be the case, for ex-
ample, in the newspaper-printing industry. Hence the reduction in trans-
port costs and protection that has occurred with globalization may not
have had much eﬀect on the location of these industries.
Our third piece of evidence consists of checking if, indeed, polluting in-
dustries are not likely to relocate so easily because of relatively high trans-
port costs. To check whether this may be the case, we estimate a standard
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Table 5.3 North-South Bilateral RCAs for Polluting Products
Sector  RCA  N  S
Pulp and paper (341) 0.23 0.10 0.13
Industrial chemicals (351) 0.41 0.21 0.20
Nonmetallic minerals (369) 0.38 0.61 –0.22
Iron and steel (371) 0.66 0.39 0.27
Nonferrous metals (372) –0.57 –0.79 0.22
Note: Computed from equation (4).bilateral trade gravity model for polluting products, and compare the co-
eﬃcients with those obtained for nonpolluting manufactures.
Take the simplest justiﬁcation for the gravity model. Trade is balanced
(in this case at the industry level, which some would ﬁnd unrealistic), and
each country consumes its output, and that of other countries according to
its share, Si, in world GNP, YW. Then (see Rauch 1999) bilateral trade be-
tween iand jwill be given by Mij (2YiYj)/YW f(Wij). The standard “gen-
eralized” gravity equation (which can be obtained from a variety of theo-
ries) can be written as Mij   f(W ij)( ij)–  where  ij is an index of barriers to
trade between i and j. W ij is a vector of other intervening variables that in-
cludes the bilateral exchange rate, eij, and prices, and  is an estimate of the
ease of substitution across suppliers.
In the standard estimation of the gravity model,  ij is captured either by
distance between partners, or if one is careful, by relative distance to an av-
erage distance among partners in the sample, D  I  S  T  (i.e., by DTij  DISTij/
D  I  S  T  ). Dummy variables that control for characteristics that are speciﬁc
to bilateral trade between i and j (e.g., a common border, BORij, land-
lockedness in either country, LLi[LLj]) are also introduced to capture the
eﬀects of barriers to trade.13 Here, we go beyond the standard formulation
by also including an index of the quality of infrastructure in each country
in period t, INF it(INF jt), higher values of the index corresponding to better
quality of infrastructure.14Finally, because we estimate the model in panel,
we include the bilateral exchange rate, RERijt, deﬁned so that an increase
in its value implies a real depreciation of i’s currency.
The above considerations lead us to estimate in panel the following
model (expected signs in parenthesis):
(5) ln Mijt    0    t    ij    1 ln Y it    2 ln Y jt    3 ln INF it
   4 ln INF jt    5 ln RERijt    6BORij    7LLi
   8LLj   [ 9 ln DYijt]    1 ln DTij    ijt
( 1   0,  2   0,  3   0,  4   0,  5   0,  6   0,  7   0,  8   0,  1   0)
In equation (5),  0is an eﬀect common to all years and pairs of countries
(constant term),  t an eﬀect speciﬁc to year t but common to all countries
(e.g., changes in the price of oil),  ij an eﬀect speciﬁc to each pair of coun-
tries but common to all years, and  ijt the error term.
In a second speciﬁcation we introduce the diﬀerence in GNP per capita
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13. Brun et al. (2002) argue that the standard barriers-to-trade function is misspeciﬁed and
propose a more general formulation that captures both variables that include country-speciﬁc
characteristics and variables that capture time-dependent costs (e.g., the price of oil). Since
here we are interested only in country-speciﬁc characteristics, time-dependent shocks are
captured by time dummies.
14. The index is itself a weighted sum of four indexes computed each year: road density,
paved roads, railway, and the number of telephone lines per capita.DYij   [(Y i/Ni) – (Y j/Nj)] in the equation, this additional variable presum-
ably capturing the eﬀects of the regulatory gap across countries. If the reg-
ulatory-gap eﬀect is important, one would expect a positive sign for  9.15
For estimation purposes, equation (5) can be rewritten as
(6) ln Mijt   Xijt  Zij  uijt with uijt    ij    ijt,
where X(Z) represents the vector of variables that vary over time (are time
invariant) and a random error-component is used because the within-
transformation in a ﬁxed-eﬀects model removes the variables that are
cross-sectional time invariant. To deal with the possibility of correlation be-
tween the explanatory variables and the speciﬁc eﬀects, we use the instru-
ment variable estimator proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981). How-
ever, we also report ﬁxed-eﬀects estimates which correspond to the correct
speciﬁcation under the maintained hypothesis (columns [1] and [2] of
table 5.4).
Because the null hypothesis of correlation between explanatory vari-
ables and the error term cannot be rejected, we reestimated the random-
eﬀects model treating the gross domestic product (GDP) variables as en-
dogenous. The results are reported in columns (3) through (6) of table 5.4.
Coeﬃcient estimates are robust and, after instrumentation, the coeﬃcient
estimates are quite close in value to those obtained under the ﬁxed-eﬀects
estimates.
First note that all coeﬃcients have the expected signs and, as usual in
gravity models with large samples, are robust to changes in speciﬁcation.16
Notably, the dummy variables for infrastructure have the expected signs
and are highly signiﬁcant. So is the real exchange rate variable, which cap-
tures, at least partly, some of the eﬀects of trade liberalization that would
not have already been captured in the time dummy variables (not reported
here). Income variables are also, as expected, highly signiﬁcant. Overall
then, except for the landlocked variables, which are at times insigniﬁcant,
all coeﬃcient estimates have expected signs and plausible values.
Compare now the results between the panel estimates for all manufac-
tures—except polluting products—(column [5]) with those for the ﬁve pol-
luting industries (column [6]). Note ﬁrst that the estimated coeﬃcient for
distance is one-third higher for the group of polluting industries compared
to the rest of manufacturing.17 Second, note that the proxy for the regula-
tory gap captured by the log diﬀerence of per capita GDPs is negative for
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15. In a full-ﬂedged model with endogenous determination of environmental policy,
Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001) obtain a reduced form in which the technique eﬀect
(change in environmental policy) is captured by changes in income per capita.
16. We also experimented with other variants (not reported here) by including population
variables and obtained virtually identical estimates for the included variables.
17. One could note that the coeﬃcient estimates on infrastructure are much higher for these

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.nonpolluting manufactures (as one would expect from the trade-theory lit-
erature under imperfect competition where trade ﬂows are an increasing
function of the similarity in income per capita) while it is insigniﬁcant
(though positive) for polluting industries. Now, if indeed the regulatory
gap can be approximated by diﬀerences in per capita GDPs across part-
ners, the presence of pollution havens would be reﬂected in a signiﬁcant
positive coeﬃcient for this variable.
Compositional eﬀects for the coeﬃcients of interest are shown in table
5.5. Nonferrous metals (and, to a lesser extent, iron and steel) stand out
with low elasticity estimates for distance. If one were to take seriously
cross-sector diﬀerences in magnitude, one would argue that the South-
North “reverse” (in the sense of the pollution-havens hypothesis) delocal-
ization of nonferrous metals according to comparative advantage in re-
sponse to the reduction in protection would have occurred because of
fewer natural barriers to trade. Of course, there are other factors as well to
explain the developments in these sectors, including the heavy protection
of these industries in the North.
The sectoral pattern of estimates for  9 indicates that the regulatory gap
would have had an eﬀect on bilateral trade patterns for two sectors: non-
metallic minerals and iron and steel, and marginally for the pulp and paper
industry. Again, nonferrous metals stands out, suggesting no eﬀect of dif-
ferences in the regulatory environment once other intervening factors are
controlled for.
In sum, the pattern of trade elasticities to transport costs obtained here
makes sense. Most heavily polluting sectors are intermediate goods, so
proximity to users should enter into location decisions more heavily than
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Table 5.5 Panel Estimates, by Industry
Equation (5)
Industry  1  9
Nonpolluting industries –0.82** –0.06**
All polluting industries –1.12** 0.007
Pulp and paper (341)a –1.40** 0.08*
Industrial chemicals (351) –1.23** 0.03
Nonmetallic minerals (369) –1.21** 0.12**
Iron and steel (371) –1.12** 0.11**
Nonferrous metals (372)a –0.95** –0.04
aAn estimate of –1.40 [–0.95] implies that if trade ﬂows are normalized to 1 for a distance of
1,000 km, a doubling of distance to 2,000 km would reduce bilateral trade volume to 0.38
[0.52].
**Signiﬁcant at the 99 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 95 percent level.customs goods that are typically high-value, low-weight industries that can
be shipped by air freight. Interestingly, after controlling for a number of
factors that inﬂuence the volume of bilateral trade, we ﬁnd little evidence
of the presence of a regulatory gap, thus broadly supporting (indirectly)
the pollution-halo hypothesis.
5.5 Conclusions
Concerns that polluting industries would “go south” was ﬁrst raised in
the late eighties, at a time when labor-intensive activities like the garment
industries were moving south in response to falling barriers to trade
worldwide. Such delocalization could be characterized as a continuous
search for “low-wage havens” by apparel manufacturers in an industry
that has remained labor intensive. Fears about pollution havens were al-
ready expressed at the time, notably because of the possible impact of the
regulatory gap between OECD economies where polluters paying more
would lead them to search for “pollution havens” analogous to low-wage
havens. Later, with the globalization debate, the hypothesis gained new
momentum by those who have read into globalization a breakdown of na-
tional borders, making it diﬃcult to control location choices by multi-
nationals.
This paper started with a review of the now-substantial evidence sur-
rounding this debate, which can be classiﬁed in three rather distinct fam-
ilies. First, aggregate comparisons of output and trade trends based on a
classiﬁcation of pollution industries based on U.S. emissions revealed
very marginal delocalization to the South. Second, ﬁrm-level estimates
of FDI location choices by and large found at best marginal evidence ei-
ther of location choice in the United States in response to cross-state dif-
ferences in environmental regulations, or of location choices by multi-
national ﬁrms across developing countries in response to diﬀerences in
environmental regulations. Reasons for this lack of response to the 
so-called regulatory gap were found in the third piece of evidence largely
assembled from developing-country case studies. Taking into account
political-economy determinants of multinational behavior in host coun-
tries and the internal trade-oﬀs between leveling up emission standards
(to avoid dealing with multiple technologies) and cutting abatement ex-
penditures, overall this literature ﬁnds no evidence of havens, but rather
of “halos.”
Turning to new evidence, this paper drew on a large sample of countries
accounting for the bulk of worldwide production and trade in polluting
products over the period 1980–1998. Globally, we found that RCA in pol-
luting products by LDCs fell as one would expect if the environment is in-
deed a normal good in consumption. At the same time, however, the de-
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of all (but one) polluting industries to the South. The exception was the re-
verse delocalization detected for nonferrous metals. We argued that this
reverse delocalization was as one would expect, according to a comparative-
advantage-driven response to trade liberalization in a sector where barri-
ers to trade turn out to be relatively small. Finally, in the aggregate, RCA
decompositions revealed no evidence of trade ﬂows’ being signiﬁcantly
driven by the regulatory gap, again with the exception of some positive ev-
idence for the nonmetallic and the iron and steel sectors.
Estimates from a panel gravity model ﬁtted to the same industries
showed that, in comparison with other industries, polluting industries had
higher barriers to trade in the form of larger elasticities of bilateral trade
with respect to transport costs. These results conﬁrm the intuition that
most heavy polluters are both weight-reducing industries and intermedi-
ates for which proximity to users should enter location decisions more
heavily than for customs goods (i.e., diﬀerentiated products) that are typi-
cally high-value products. Finally, after controlling for several factors that
inﬂuence the volume of bilateral trade, we ﬁnd little evidence of the pres-
ence of a regulatory gap.
In sum, the paper provided some support for the pollution-havens hy-
pothesis, a result in line with several earlier studies reviewed here. Beyond
this result, the paper contributed to the debate by identifying a new expla-
nation for the less-than-expected delocalization that had been neither
identiﬁed nor quantiﬁed in the literature: relatively high natural barriers to
trade in the typical heavily polluting industries.
In concluding, one should however keep in mind two important caveats
with respect to the pollution-havens debate. First, like the rest of the liter-
ature reviewed in the paper, we only examined manufactures. This implies
that we did not take into account resource-extracting industries that may
have successively sought pollution havens. Second, even within the narrow
conﬁnes of trade-pattern quantiﬁcation, a fuller evaluation of the debate
on trade, globalization, and the environment would also have to examine
the direct and indirect energy content of trade.
Appendix
This appendix describes the data, transformations, and sample represen-
tativity; gives sectoral tables corresponding to the aggregate results for all
polluting products given in tables 5.2 and 5.4 in the text; and does the same
for ﬁgures 5.1 to 5.3 in the text.
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The database is extracted from the Trade and Production Web site of the
World Bank (www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/data/TradeandProduc-
tion.html) and covers the period 1976–1999 for sixty-seven countries. It in-
cludes ISIC three-digit data on imports, exports and mirror exports. For
the ﬁrst ﬁve years and for the last year of the open-sample period, many
countries reported missing values. Moreover, mirror exports are only avail-
able since 1980. Therefore, a closed sample was deﬁned over the years 1981
to 1998, with ﬁfty-two countries (ﬁve low-income countries, twenty-ﬁve
middle-income countries, twenty-two high-income countries) reporting
nonmissing values for the three-digit trade data over this period. Cate-
gories of polluting products are presented in table 5A.1, and closed-sample
countries18 are listed in table 5A.2.
Sample Representativity
Open and Closed Samples
With respect to the open sample, and using the average trade shares for
1995–1996 (the years with the maximum amount of nonmissing values),
the closed sample represents about 95 percent of the open-sample trade.
Regarding the representativity of the open sample itself, this was esti-
mated using world trade data reported by the World Bank (2001). Results
are shown in table 5A.3. These ﬁgures may appear quite low. However, it
should be kept in mind that world trade ﬁgures used in these calculations
are, themselves, estimated. As a result, even in the original World Bank
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Table 5A.1 Categories of Polluting Products
ISIC Code Descriptiona
341 Paper and products (6)
351 Industrial chemicals (3)
369 Other nonmetallic mineral products (5)
371 Iron and steel (1)
372 Nonferrous metals (2)
Notes: Ranks in parentheses.
aMani and Wheeler (1999, table 8.1). As in Mani and Wheeler, we have excluded petroleum
reﬁneries (ISIC = 353) from the sample.
18. Income groups were deﬁned on the basis of 1991 GNP per capita ﬁgures. Following the
World Bank cut-oﬀ levels, the sample was split into three income groups: low- (income lower
than U.S.$635), middle- (between U.S.$635 and U.S.$7,910), and high- (larger than
U.S.$7,910) income countries.data, the sum of exports and imports over 207 countries represent less than
100 percent of world totals (see last two columns of table 5A.3).
Income Groups
Similar world totals were not available for income groups. In this case,
world totals were estimated by the sum of exports or imports over all the
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Table 5A.2 Countries of the Closed Sample (1981–1998)
Low-Income Middle-Income High-Income
EGY Egypt ARG Argentina AUS Australia
HND Honduras BOL Bolivia AUT Austria
IDN Indonesia CHL Chile CAN Canada
IND India COL Colombia CYP Cyprus
NPL Nepal CRI Costa Rica DNK Denmark
ECU Ecuador ESP Spain
GRC Greece FIN Finland
GTM Guatemala FRA France
HUN Hungary GBR The United Kingdom
JOR Jordan GER Germany
KORK orea, Republic of HKG Hong Kong
MAC Macau IRL Ireland
MAR Morocco ITA Italy
MEX Mexico JPN Japan
MYS Malaysia KWT Kuwait
PER Peru NLD The Netherlands
PHL The Philippines NOR Norway
POL Poland NZL New Zealand
PRT Portugal SGP Singapore
THA Thailand SWE Sweden
TTO Trinidad and Tobago TWN Taiwan




Table 5A.3 Representativity of the Open and Closed Samples (%, using reported
world totals by the World Bank)
Open Sample Closed Sample Original Sourcea
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
1981 48.8 44.3 48.7 43.7 81.5 81.3
1990 58.9 59.5 57.3 57.9 86.4 86.2
1998 63.6 66.3 60.5 63.6 94.5 94.5
Sources: Sample data and World Bank (2001).
aSum over the 207 countries reported in the World Bank database.countries available in the World Bank source. To account for a maximum
number of nonmissing reporters, these calculations, whose results appear
in table 5A.4, are limited to year 1998.19
Generally speaking, representativity is larger for high-income countries
(and of course for the open sample). However, even for low- and middle-
income countries in the closed sample, the coverage of world trade is larger
than 50 percent (except for low-income countries’ imports).
Polluting Products
Similar calculations were not possible for polluting products, as world
trade data were not available at this level of disaggregation. However, a
very crude indicator of the representativity of the sample for these products
is simply the ratio of imports over exports, which should be equal to 1.0 in
case of complete coverage. These ﬁgures, along with their standardized
value obtained by dividing them by the import/export ratio for all products
in the sample, are reported in table 5A.5.
Overall, the ratio is reasonably close to 1.0, which suggests an acceptable
level of representativity for polluting products. The sectoral results appear
in tables 5A.6–5A.8, and in ﬁgures 5A.1 and 5A.2.
Table 5A.4 Representativity of the Open and Closed Samples by Income Groups 
(%, 1998)
Open Sample Closed Sample
Exports Imports Exports Imports
Low-income countries 64.6 61.4 52.1 46.8
Middle-income countries 74.9 72.2 56.4 56.1
High-income countries 92.8 92.9 92.8 92.9
All 88.3 87.5 84.1 83.7
Sources: Sample data and World Bank (2001).
Notes: Using calculated world totals (sum over the 207 countries reported in the World Bank
database).
Table 5A.5 Imports-over-Exports Ratios
Polluting Products All Products
(1) (2) (1)/(2)
1981 0.96 0.92 1.04
1990 1.11 1.03 1.08
1998 1.14 1.03 1.10
Globalization and Dirty Industries: Do Pollution Havens Matter? 189
19. Accordingly, it is a more recent classiﬁcation of countries by income groups (based on
1999 GNP ﬁgures) that is applied in this particular table.Table 5A.6 Shares of Developing Countries in World Trade
Polluting Products All Products Revealed Revealed
Comparative Comparative
Exports Imports Exports Imports Advantage Disadvantage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1)/(3) (2)/(4)
Paper and Products (ISIC   341)
1981–83 3.70 12.70 9.40 15.73 0.39 0.81
1996–98 9.55 19.92 15.93 18.67 0.60 1.07
Rate of growth 6.53 3.05 3.58 1.15
Industrial Chemicals (ISIC  351)
1981–83 5.11 21.55 9.40 15.73 0.54 1.37
1996–98 12.12 24.33 15.93 18.67 0.76 1.30
Rate of growth 5.92 0.82 3.58 1.15
Other Nonmetallic Mineral Products (ISIC   369)
1981–83 11.42 22.33 9.40 15.73 1.22 1.42
1996–98 16.28 19.16 15.93 18.67 1.02 1.03
Rate of growth 2.39 –1.02 3.58 1.15
Iron and Steel (ISIC   371)
1981–83 9.09 23.63 9.40 15.73 0.97 1.50
1996–98 18.38 26.85 15.93 18.67 1.15 1.44
Rate of growth 4.81 0.86 3.58 1.15
Nonferrous Metals (ISIC   372)
1981–83 24.01 10.31 9.40 15.73 2.56 0.66
1996–98 22.91 17.88 15.93 18.67 1.44 0.96
Rate of growth –0.31 3.73 3.58 1.15
Table 5A.7 Decomposition of Aggregate Change in Revealed Comparative
Advantage (RCA) for Developing Countries
ISIC Total Change Composition Structural
Code in RCA Eﬀect Eﬀect
341 0.206 –0.060 0.266
351 0.216 –0.087 0.303
369 –0.193 –0.301 0.108
371 0.186 –0.260 0.446
372 –1.118 –0.529 –0.589Table 5A.8 Gravity Equation: Hausman-Taylor Estimates
Mijt
Independent Variable POL-HT 341 351 369 371 372
ln(Y it) 1.50** 1.26** 1.27** 1.69** 1.82** 1.91**
(19.4) (12.6) (16.39) (15.4) (16.5) (17.8)
ln(Yjt) 0.92** 0.58 1.86** –0.58** –0.32* –0.16
(10.9) (5.0) (21.8) (5.0) (2.5) (1.3)
ln(Y it/Nit) – ln(Y jt/Njt) 0.007 0.08* 0.03 0.12** 0.11** –0.04
(0.3) (2.0) (1.1) (3.5) (2.7) (1.1)
ln DISTij –1.12** –1.40** –1.23** –1.21** –1.12** –0.95**
(17.7) (14.4) (19.1) (12.9) (7.9) (6.8)
BORij 1.30** 1.68** 1.15** 1.70** 0.96** 0.87
(5.5) (4.01) (4.6) (4.2) (2.8) (1.6)
LLi 0.49 0.52 –0.28 1.76** 2.79** 2.26**
(1.66) (1.0) (0.9) (3.4) (4.23) (3.3)
LLj –0.42** –2.48** –1.99** –4.39** –3.79** –2.48**
(1.22) (3.8) (5.4) (6.9) (4.25) (3.3)
ln INFit 0.46** 0.48** 0.43** 0.98** 0.51** 0.55**
(6.43) (5.1) (6.1) (9.3) (4.4) (4.9)
ln INFjt 0.64** 1.19** 0.26** 2.22** 1.43** 0.15
(7.7) (9.9) (3.0) (18.6) (9.9) (1.2)
ln RERijt –0.40* –0.57** –0.35** –0.66** –0.71** –0.19**
(14.3) (14.3) (12.6) (16.3) (16.6) (5.1)
No. of observations 30,345 21,831 28,087 20,907 21,122 21,591
(NT)
No. of bilateral (N) 2,300 2,017 2,240 1,970 1,938 1,956
R2 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.44 0.51 0.35
Hausman test HT  614.7** 413.1** 589.6** 13.7** 97.9** 182.5**
vs. Chi-2(K) Chi-2(25) Chi-2(25) Chi-2(25) Chi-2(25) Chi-2(25) Chi-2(25)
Notes: Dependent variable: Mijt (imports of i from j in period t). T-student in parentheses. Time dummy
variables and constant term not reported. Random eﬀect estimates (endogenous variables: Y i and Y j and
[Y i/Ni] – [Y j/Nj]).
**Signiﬁcant at the 99 percent level.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 5A.2 Beginning-of-period (1) and end-of-period (2) RCAs, by country group:
A, ISIC   341; B, ISIC   351; C, ISIC   369; D, ISIC   371; E, ISIC   372B
Fig. 5A.2 (cont.) Beginning-of-period (1) and end-of-period (2) RCAs, by 
country group: A, ISIC   341; B, ISIC   351; C, ISIC   369; D, ISIC   371; 
E, ISIC   372C
Fig. 5A.2 (cont.) D
Fig. 5A.2 (cont.) Beginning-of-period (1) and end-of-period (2) RCAs, by 
country group: A, ISIC   341; B, ISIC   351; C, ISIC   369; D, ISIC   371; 
E, ISIC   372E
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Comment Simon J. Evenett
Although much commentary on the consequences of the latest wave of
international market integration has focused on economic matters, a vo-
cal and important element of the policymaking community has been con-
cerned with the environmental eﬀects of globalization. With an eye to
journalistic and policymaking audiences, environmental critics of trade,
investment, and other reforms quickly coined two terms that have subse-
quently gained widespread currency, speciﬁcally the “pollution havens”
hypothesis and the “race to the bottom” hypothesis. These seemingly
plausible conjectures about how ﬁrms and governments behave in the glo-
bal economy have now been subject to considerable scrutiny by research-
ers, as the balanced and methodical paper by Grether and de Melo ably
demonstrates. It turns out that neither hypothesis is an accurate general
characterization of ﬁrm or government behavior; yet certain circum-
stances can be identiﬁed where these hypotheses might not be at odds with
observed behavior. This conclusion probably conﬁrms what cautious ob-
servers from all camps have known all along, and serves the useful purpose
of taking some of the wind out of the sails of the more partisan commen-
tators.
In this comment I shall focus on the fourth section of Grether and de
Melo’s chapter, which attempts to quantify the eﬀects of regulatory gaps on
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fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford.international trade ﬂows in selected nonpolluting and polluting industries.
One of the goals of their analysis is to examine whether higher interna-
tional transportation costs in polluting industries would—for a given reg-
ulatory gap—diminish the incentives for ﬁrms to relocate production from
the industrialized economies to the developing countries. The logic, ap-
parently, is that relocation would require shipping products from a pro-
duction location in a new, developing country to customers in industrial-
ized countries and that high international transportation costs would
erode (if not entirely oﬀset) any cost advantage of shifting production to a
jurisdiction with less-stringent environmental regulations. Consistent with
this thesis, Grether and de Melo found that, in a traditional gravity equa-
tion framework, the (absolute value) of the estimated distance elasticities
were larger for ﬁve goods that are known to involve greater pollution dur-
ing production than a composite of other goods that are thought to involve
less pollution. In interpreting this ﬁnding, much turns on how convinced
one is that the estimated distance parameters are really picking up inter-
national transportation costs and not some other distance-related cost of
conducting international trade, such as the cost of acquiring information
at potential sales opportunities. Indeed, one might ask what the evidence
is that the latter costs are greater for products made in polluting industries.
In this regard, it is also worth noting Grossman’s (1998) skepticism about
the plausibility of the magnitude of estimated distance elasticities in grav-
ity equation studies.
In my view, the weakest aspect of Grether and de Melo’s analysis con-
cerns the construction and interpretation of the variable proxying for the
regulatory gap. Grether and de Melo use bilateral diﬀerences in per capita
national income to proxy for national diﬀerences in the stringency of envi-
ronmental regulation, an assumption that they justify by making reference
to a prediction of a theoretical model in Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor
(2001). They then go on to examine whether the estimated parameter for
this proxy variable is a statistically signiﬁcant determinant of bilateral
trade ﬂows. In only two of the ﬁve polluting industries (nonmetallic min-
erals, and iron and steel) is the estimated proxy positive and statistically
signiﬁcant (see the parameter estimates for  9in table 5.5). Moreover, these
positive elasticities are remarkably small when compared to the size of the
estimated elasticities of the traditional gravity variables, such as national
income. Taking a unitary elasticity for national income (which is in line
with the relevant parameter estimates reported in table 5.4), in the case of
nonmetallic minerals the estimated elasticity on the regulatory gap term
implies that a 1 percent increase in this gap would have an eﬀect on trade
ﬂows equal to an eighth of the size of a 1 percent change in gross domestic
product of either trading partner. It would seem, then, in terms of the im-
pact on trade ﬂows, that national diﬀerences in environmental regulation
have little economically signiﬁcant eﬀect on trade ﬂows.
204 Jean-Marie Grether and Jaime de MeloOr do they? The interpretational problem arises from the fact, as
Grether and de Melo note, that in many trade models diﬀerences in per
capita national incomes are an independent determinant of international
trade ﬂows—that is, independent of environmental regulation. Unfortu-
nately, the authors do not draw out the implications of this observation for
the interpretation of the estimated parameters. Essentially, the estimated
parameter on diﬀerences in per capita national incomes conﬂates the eﬀect
on trade ﬂows created by national diﬀerences in environmental regulations
with another independent determinant of trade ﬂows. Worse, in the ap-
proach taken in this chapter, there appears to be no way to separate out
these two inﬂuences. This implies that the estimated parameter for per
capita income diﬀerences of –0.06 for nonpolluting manufacturing indus-
tries could include a small component that is due to regulatory gaps (say,
 0.02). Or the latter could be large (say,  0.7). The point is that we just
cannot tell how large the eﬀects of the regulatory gap are. Consequently,
this chapter does not accomplish one of its own objectives, namely, to esti-
mate the eﬀect of national diﬀerences in environmental regulation on in-
ternational trade ﬂows. It would appear, then, that another proxy for those
national diﬀerences is called for if this hurdle is to be overcome in future
research.
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